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Abstract 
One-Time Passwords (OTP) can provide complete protection of the login-time authentication mechanism against replay 
attacks. In this paper, we propose TSOTP: a new effective simple OTP method that generates a unique passcode for each 
use. The calculation uses both time stamps and sequence numbers.  A two-factor authentication prototype for mobile 
phones using this method has been developed and has been used in practice for a year. 
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1. Introduction 
One-Time Passwords (OTP) can act to augment existing user IDs and passwords with an extra layer of 
authentication to enhance security for all authenticated applications. The reason is that if a password is 
compromised, the OTP would still have to be broken as well to gain access. This kind of authentication is 
called two-factor authentication, a stronger kind of authentication. 
The increasing authenticated applications and the growing attacks keep driving OTP technology. The idea 
of an OTP was first suggested by Leslie Lamport [1] in the early 1980s. Nowadays, there are many patented 
OTP tokens [2][3][4]. The method of delivering the OTP may be a proprietary token, via mobile phone, on 
 
 
* Corresponding author.  Tel.: 86-021-34205440; fax: 86-021-34205440. 
E-mail address: lai-xj@cs.sjtu.edu.cn 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
lection and peer r view under responsibility of Informatio  Engineering Research Institut
ScienceDirect
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
33 Yun Huang et al. /  IERI Procedia  4 ( 2013 )  32 – 37 
 
paper or a web-based approach. A few standards[5][6][7] have been developed to  facilitate adoption of OTP 
authentication by enabling interoperability across commercial and open-source implementations for a better 
user experience.  
The first step of OTP technology is OTP calculation, which is the algorithm to generate a unique passcode 
for every authentication. 
This paper is about a novel OTP calculation and its application. We illustrate the method of the calculation 
in Section 2. Its application is discussed in Section 3. Conclusion and future work are described in Section 4. 
2. Method of Calculation 
An OTP calculation focuses on the claimant generating a unique, fresh passcode to the verifier for every 
authentication. 
The idea of an OTP was first suggested by Leslie Lamport [1] in the early 1980s. In Lamport’s scheme, the 
user begins with a secret w and a constant t, defining the number of identifications to be allowed. A one-way 
function (OWF) H is used to define the password sequence: w0= Ht(w), Ht-1(w), Ht-2(w), …, Ht-i(w). The 
password for the ith identification session, 1  i  t, is defined to be wi = Ht i(w). Its one disadvantage is the 
claimant’s high computation cost. This high computation requirement makes the scheme unsuitable for 
devices with limited resources, e.g., mobile phones. RSA patented the SecurID® token [2], which could be 
hardware or software and generates an OTP every 60 seconds as an output of a mathematical operation. This 
scheme cannot generate a new OTP in less than 60 seconds. 
An OTP calculation using only sequence numbers does not guarantee that a verifier will be able to detect 
forced delay attacks.  
In our OTP prototype for mobile phones, we first calculate an OTP based on time stamps to avoid high 
computation cost on the claimant side as in Lamport’s scheme and to detect forced delay attacks. Due to 
message transit time, processing time and clock drift, an acceptance window is used by the verifier. Non-
uniqueness of OTPs within the acceptance window is handled. In Fig. 1, the slash area is the union set of the 
acceptance windows for times TA and TB. An OTP in the slash area must be constrained to be authenticated 
only once. 
 
Fig. 1. Acceptance window only with time stamps 
We find that the concatenation of time stamp and sequence number is a simple and effective solution. 
From Fig. 2, because the added sequence number increases monotonically, the acceptance window for time 
TA is separated from the next window. Thus the OTP’s uniqueness is guaranteed, even with two verifications 
within 60 seconds. 
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Fig. 2. Acceptance window with time stamps and sequence numbers 
3. The Application 
Based on our OTP calculation, we developed a TSOTP Two-Factor authentication prototype. The 
claimant’s OTP calculation was done on mobile phones. The main relevant operations are described here. 
3.1. Preparation step of shared secrets 
Authentication is that the claimant “proves” its identity to the verifier by providing its uniqueness or 
timeliness guarantee to the knowledge of a secret known to be associated with itself during the authentication 
protocol.  
For generating shared secrets in the OTP authentication system, we considered the following 
challenge/response protocol through an SSL communication channel: 
1 The claimant registers his TokenID to the verifier; 
C V: TokenID; 
2 The verifier generates a random seed value for the claimant; 
V C: Act = ERandomseed(TokenID); 
3 The claimant calculates the initial value Nonce0 by concatenating the time stamp and sequence number, 
and encryptes the Nonce0 using AES to form the shared secret Sk, returns Sk to the verifier: 
       Nonce0= time stamp0 || sequence number0 
C V: Sk = EAct(Nonce0); 
Then the derived shared secret Sk is kept decrypted on both sides for further OTP transmissions without the 
SSL communication channel. 
3.2. Claimant: generation of OTPs 
Our OTPs are 64-bits strings in length, displayed as 8 decimal digits. The possible brute force attacks 
succeed with probability of close to 10^-8[5]. We believe that this length is long enough to be secure and short 
enough to be manually entered by users when necessary. 
Step 1: Calculate a Nonce based on both time stamp and sequence number: 
Nonce = time stamp || sequence number 
Step 2: Encrypte the Nonce for its integrity by AES algorithm:  
HA = ESk (Nonce)  
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// HA is a 128-bits (16-bytes) string 
Step 3: Form an 8-bytes string OTP by DT (Dynamic Truncation):  
OTP = DT(HA)  
// OTP is a string, displayed as 8 decimal digits. 
3.3. Verifier: validation of OTPs 
The verifier is initially given Nonce0 and Sk in the preparation. Every authentication, the verifier calculates 
the OTPs by the same method as the claimant, with the time stamp and sequence number varying in the 
acceptance windows. If an OTP from the claimant matches any of the verifier's OTP, then it is accepted as 
valid. In this case, the verifier updates its time stamp and sequence number values. If there is no match, the 
verifier tries the resend windows of OTP validation for more usability. For the OTPs in the resend windows, 
the verifier asks the claimant to resend two successive OTPs. The different windows of OTP validation are 
shown in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3. Different windows of OTP validation 
As shown in Fig. 3, we set two throttling parameters for acceptance windows, TimeAccept and 
CounterAccept, which define the maximum number of possible attempts for OTP validation. Also we set two 
throttling parameters for resend windows, TimeResend and CounterResend, which define the maximum 
number of possible attempts for OTP resend. The throttling parameters should be set as low as possible for 
security, while still ensuring appropriate usability. The specific values are determined experimentally by the 
system administrator. 
3.4. The experience result 
Defense against replay attacks and forced delay attacks.  
A replay attack is a kind of impersonation or other deception involving use of information from a single 
previous protocol execution, on the same or a different verifier [8]. A forced delay occurs when an adversary 
intercepts a message and relays it at some later point in time [8]. 
Unlike a fixed password scheme, a one-time password system prevents replay attacks. In such OTP 
authentication system, OTPs value by keyboard input and crossing the network were used only once, so 
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replay attacks – whether shoulder surfing, keyboard logging Trojans, or network eavesdropping – become 
useless. Time stamps, also used in our system, allowed the detection of forced delay attacks. 
Ease of use.  
Our OTP authentication prototype for mobile phones has the advantages of simple one-pass authentication 
message exchange, no need for a third party, low computation cost and lower financial costs than proprietary 
tokens. 
Vulnerability of the mobile phone.  
Our prototype for mobile phones is vulnerable to keyboard monitor attacks, memory scan attacks and 
software clone attacks, because of mobile phone’s limited resources. 
4. Conclusion and Future Work 
One-Time Passwords are a leading technology in today’s Two-factor Authentication Systems for more 
secure applications. 
In this paper, we described TSOTP, a simple and effective OTP method that generates a unique passcode 
for one-time use. The calculation is based on both time stamps and sequence numbers. We also developed a 
two-factor authentication prototype for mobile phones using this OTP calculation. The prototype was used in 
practice for a year and provided complete protection against replay attacks and detection of forced delay 
attacks. The implementation had the advantage of simple one-pass authentication message exchange, no need 
for a third party, low computation cost and no cost for proprietary tokens.   
However, using a mobile phone as the OTPs generator has vulnerabilities to keyboard monitor attacks, 
memory scan attacks and software clone attacks. We will try to counter these threats in future research. 
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